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TN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, " 910306 
v. t 
EDWARD STEPHEN DELI, t Categorv T . 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF " APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appea 
criminal homicide, murder - second degree, hot, .. - egree 
felonies -3-203 (1990); one 
count of attempted r ..uia. ..v*. ,* . ip- mn degree, 
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and 76 ~^~ 
degree felonj < ^it 1 > f Utah Code 
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nf lltrifi Cf fl990) - * - r . s d . \ i o n 
to hear the appeal unde *.,. , 
199?) because the appea :s from a district )urt a criminal 
cast* , . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Are the consecutive sentences given defendant 
illegal? Whether a sentence is illegal is reviewed under a 
correction of error standard. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 
(Utah 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 883 (1992). 
2. Does defendant's failure below to raise his claim 
that his sentences violate the Utah Constitution constitute 
waiver of the issue on appeal? State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 
29 (Utah 1990) (defendant cannot assert, as a basis of error on 
appeal, an issue he did not raise in the trial court "even though 
defendant's claim involves a constitutional right"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 24, 1990, defendant1 was charged with two 
counts of criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, both 
capital felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 
(1990);2 one count of attempted criminal homicide, murder in the 
first degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-5-202 and 76-4-101 (1990); one count of aggravated 
arson, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-103 (1990); two counts of aggravated kidnapping, both first 
*A codefendant, Von Lester Taylor, was tried separately. 
2In 1991, the legislature amended the title of this crime to 
"aggravated murder." This brief will use the terminology in 
effect at the time of the crime. 
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degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 76-5-302 
(1990); one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990); one count of 
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990); and one count of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990). 
(Record [hereafter R.] at 2-7). 
A jury trial was conducted May 7-10 and 13-14, 1991 in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel, district judge, presiding. (R. at 241-
49). Defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree 
murder (lesser included offenses of capital homicide) and as 
charged on the other seven counts. (R. at 249 and 310-29). On 
June 3, 1991, the court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison 
terms on each count, commensurate with the statutory sentencing 
scheme. The court also sentenced defendant to enhanced penalties 
for the crimes in which a firearm was used. (R. at 372-78). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This appeal involves the sentences given defendant and 
no transcript of the full evidence has been made part of the 
record. The following facts of the crime are taken from the 
probable cause statement attached to the charging document: 
Linae Tiede told the officers she went to 
the Rolf Tiede residence in Beaver Springs 
Subdivision during the afternoon of December 
22, 1990, with her mother, Kaye Tiede, and 
Grandmother, Beth Potts. Upon approaching 
the residence, the three women were 
confronted by the defendants, both of whom 
were armed. The defendants, Von Lester 
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Taylor and Edward Steven Deli[,] ordered the 
women into the residence, A few minutes 
later, the defendant, Von Lester Taylor[,] 
shot Beth Potts and Kaye Tiede with a 
handgun. The defendants then tied up Linae 
Tiede. Approximately an hour and a half to 
two hours later, Rolf Tiede and Tricia Tiede 
came to the residence and were confronted by 
the defendants. The defendants demanded 
money from Rolf Tiede at gunpoint, and Rolf 
Tiede removed more than $100.00 in cash from 
his wallet and placed it on the ground. The 
defendant, Von Lester Taylor, then shot Mr. 
Tiede in the face with a handgun. While Mr. 
Tiede was on the ground, Mr. Taylor shot him 
a second time. Prior to leaving, the 
defendant, Edward Steven Deli, deposited 
snowmobile fuel in several locations in the 
Rolf Tiede home, and ignited the liquid. 
The defendants then fled from the 
residence with Tricia Tiede and Linae Tiede 
who[m] the defendants intended to use as 
"shields" in the event they were confronted 
by the police. After traveling by snowmobile 
approximately two miles to the place where 
Rolf Tiede's Lincoln automobile was located, 
the defendants demanded that Linae Tiede and 
Tricia Tiede leave with them in the vehicle. 
While defendants were driving away, they were 
observed by Randy Zorn who realized something 
was wrong and contacted the Summit County 
Sheriff's Department. 
Deputies from the Summit County Sheriff's 
Office arrived at the Rolf Tiede residence 
and discovered Rolf Tiede was still alive. 
The other two victims, Beth Potts and Kaye 
Tiede, were pronounced dead by medical 
personnel. 
(R. at 6-7). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's sentences do not violate the thirty-year 
limitation on imprisonment of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1990) 
because the statute states that it may not be construed to affect 
the validity of any sentence; it may only serve to limit the 
length of sentences actually served. In addition, the statute 
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states that the thirty-year limitation does not apply if any of 
the offenses involved in the consecutive sentences carries a 
maximum sentence of life in prison. Seven of the nine sentences 
given defendant carry such a maximum. Finally, defendant 
incorrectly adds the firearm enhancements from the first degree 
felony convictions to the non-first degree felony convictions to 
arrive at a fifty-five year total. Any first degree felony 
sentence, which carries a maximum of life in prison, is excluded 
from computation for the thirty-year limitation in Utah Code Ann, 
S 76-3-401(4). The firearm enhancements are just that; they are 
not sentences separate from the underlying first degree felony 
sentences. Consequently, they cannot be divorced from the 
underlying sentences for purposes of computing the limitation. 
Defendant's failure to raise below the claim that his 
sentences violate the Utah Constitution constitutes waiver of 




DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES DO NOT VIOLATE THE 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-3-401. 
Defendant argues that his sentences are incorrect 
because they fall afoul of Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401 (1990).3 
That provision reads, in pertinent part? 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
(4) If a court imposes consecutive 
sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' 
imprisonment. However, this limitation does 
not apply if an offense for which the 
defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
(6) In determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which 
they shall be served, the Board of Pardons 
shall treat the defendant as though he has 
been committed for a single term that shall 
consist of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
defendant did not object below to the sentences handed 
down; neither does he cite authority for excusing his failure to 
challenge his sentences. Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, states: "The court may correct an illegal sentence, 
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." See 
also State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825 (1932) (a district 
court may reassume jurisdiction to correct an erroneous and void 
sentence, irrespective of the time limits); State v. Babbel, 813 
P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 883 (1992). 
Since the sentences handed down in this case are not illegal, 
defendant's failure to object to the sentences below also 
constitutes waiver. 
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(a) if the aggregate maximum term 
exceeds the 30-year limitation the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run 
consecutively, the minimum term if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly 
imposed minimum terms. 
(8) This section may not be construed to 
restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or 
to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of 
sentences actually served under the 
commitments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1990). Review of the legality of a 
sentence is under a correction-of-error standard. State v. 
Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 883 
(1992). 
Defendant's apparent argument is that his sentences for 
the crimes which did not carry the maximum of life imprisonment 
add up to more than thirty years, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-401(4). This argument fails for three reasons: 1) 
Subsection 8 prohibits that construction of the statute; 2) 
subsection (4) prohibits application of the thirty-year 
limitation if "an offense for which the defendant is sentenced" 
authorizes a maximum sentence of life; and 3) the five-year 
firearm enhancements apply to the sentences which carry the 
maximum of life imprisonment. 
A. Construction of the Statute Precludes This 
Argument. 
The plain language of the statute prevents the 
construction defendant argues. Subsection (8) states that the 
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statute may not be construed Mto affect the validity of any 
sentence"; the statute may "only • . • limit the length of 
sentences actually served under the commitments." That concept 
is reiterated in subsection (6) which directs the Board of 
Pardons in "determining the effect of consecutive sentences." 
Based on the statute, consecutive sentences totalling more than 
thirty years may be lawfully imposed by the courts; the statute 
then governs the effect to be given the sentences by the Board of 
Pardons. See State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120-21 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
B. Application to Maximum of Life Imprisonment. 
Defendant was sentenced for nine felonies, seven of 
which carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. (R. at 374-
76). The two non-life sentences were for second degree felony 
theft, punishable by one to fifteen years in prison/ and third 
degree felony aggravated assault, punishable by zero to five 
years with a consecutive firearm enhancement not to exceed five 
years. (R. at 376). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) provides that 
the thirty-year "limitation does not apply if an offense for 
which the defendant is sentenced authorizes . . . a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment." (Emphasis added). Since this 
provision deals with consecutive sentences and does not read "the 
offense," a logical interpretation of this provision is that the 
limitation does not apply if any of the offenses which lead to 
the consecutive sentences authorizes life imprisonment. 
*No firearm enhancement was added to the theft conviction. 
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This interpretation also points out the futility of 
defendant's argument. Even if this Court were to read the 
statute in the manner defendant asks, only the sentences for the 
theft and aggravated assault (with its accompanying firearm 
enhancement) would be affected. The seven first degree felony 
convictions still support the seven consecutive five-years-to-
life sentences. 
C* The Limitation is not Applicable to the Firearm 
Enhancements to the First Degree Felony Sentences. 
In claiming that his consecutive sentences exceed 
thirty years, defendant adds the consecutive one-to-five year 
firearm enhancements on the first degree felony sentences to the 
non-first degree sentences to arrive at fifty-five years. The 
enhancements are not separate sentences; instead, they are 
enhancements to the original sentences. State v. Angus. 581 P.2d 
992, 994 (Utah 1978) (the legislature has determined that use of 
a firearm justifies an "enhancement of penalty"). Since these 
enhancements are to sentences which allow a maximum of life 
imprisonment, the thirty-year limitation does not apply and the 
enhancements should not be factored into the non-first degree 
felony convictions. 
Point II of defendant's brief merely restates, in three 
lines, the argument of Point I; consequently, the State relies on 
the arguments in this point and will not respond separately to 
defendant's Point II. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES DO NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Defendant claims that his sentences violate art. I, § 9 
of the Utah Constitution because they treat him "with unnecessary 
rigor." Defendant did not raise this claim below and should be 
precluded from raising it on appeal. See State v. Anderson, 789 
P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (defendant cannot assert, as a basis of 
error on appeal, an issue he did not raise in the trial court 
"even though defendant's claim involves a constitutional 
right").5 
5Even if this issue were not waived, defendant has not 
demonstrated that his sentences constitute a constitutional 
violation. The court, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(2), considered "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences." In the written judgment and sentence the court 
listed specific findings which support the consecutive sentences. 
(R. at 376-78). These included: 1) "The offense was 
characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity"; 2) the victims 
were "unusually vulnerable"; 3) defendant was a fugitive from 
justice at the time the crimes were committed; and 4) "society is 
at risk if the defendant should ever be allowed release" from 
prison. (R. at 376-77). At the sentencing proceeding, the court 
verbally listed the reasons for consecutive sentences. (The one 
transcript ordered in this case contains the trial testimony of 
one witness and, toward the back of the bound volume, the 
sentencing proceeding; a copy of the court's remarks at 
sentencing is included as an addendum to this brief). The 
factors he considered were: 1) The "senselessness and brutality" 
of the crimes; 2) the "severe physical and emotional injury" to 
the surviving victims; 3) no sign in defendant of "genuine 
sympathy or compassion" for the victims; and 4) defendant's 
previous prison incarceration. (Transcript of sentencing 
proceeding at 24-25 and 28-29; see addendum). 
Defendant has not challenged any of these findings; the 
only argument he raises to support his claim that he was treated 
with unnecessary rigor is that the victims, police, and 
prosecutors were dissatisfied with the jury verdicts of second 
degree murder instead of capital murder. Whether there was 
-10-
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this .25- day of November, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Martin V. Gravis, Attorney for Defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd. 
#203, Ogden, Utah 84401, this P5S day of November, 1992. 
"AgYtfr*? I3fcritr^ 
dissatisfaction or not is immaterial to a claim of unnecessarily 
rigorous treatment. As the court stated in the judgment, the 
consecutive sentences are justified by the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and defendant's history and 
character. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
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ADDENDUM 
1 76-3-203, THE SPECIFIC WORDING THAT THE TRIER OF FACT 
2 MUST FIND A FIREARM OR FASCIMILE WAS USED TO ENHANCE THE 
3 SENTENCE, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A SPECIFIC FINDING BY 
4 THE JURY. 
5 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE 
6 FOUND THE SAME THING WITH RESPECT TO THE AGGRAVATED 
7 ROBBERY, WHICH MAKES THE SAME SITUATION WITH AGGRAVATED 
8 USE OF THE WEAPON, AND FURTHERMORE, THE HOMICIDES, 
9 THERE'S NO QUESTION THE MURDERS WERE CAUSED BY A FIREARM. 
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. DELI, IS THERE 
11 ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO SAY TO THE COURT AT THIS TIME? 
12 MR. GRAVIS: HE HAS NOTHING TO SAY, YOUR 
13 HONOR. 
14 THE COURT: WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND. 
15 MR. DELI, ON MAY 14 OF 1991, YOU WERE 
16 CONVICTED OF 14 COUNTS, INCLUDING THE MURDERS OF BETH 
17 POTTS AND KAY TIEDE. THAT VERDICT WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER 
18 LONG AND WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT 
19 DELIBERATIONS. THE VERDICT WAS ARRIVED AT, BUT THE 
20 VERDICT WAS ARRIVED AT ACCORDING TO THE RULE OF LAW, AND 
21 ACCORDING TO THE TRADITION OF THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT FOR 
22 THE LAST 200 YEARS OF THIS COUNTY'S HISTORY. 
23 ACCORDINGLY, THAT VERDICT IS ENTITLED TO THE RESPECT OF 
24 THIS COURT, THIS COMMUNITY AND OF ALL LAW ABIDING 
25 CITIZENS. 
PPPPn RARKF.R. CSR 
1 NOW, IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO SENTENCE YOU, 
2 MR. DELI, FOR THOSE CRIMES. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS 
3 SENTENCING I HAVE REVIEWED THE RECORD IN THIS CASE, 
4 INCLUDING MY NOTES AND PRE-SENTENCE REPORT AND ALL 
5 EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL, EVERYTHING SUBMITTED TO ME, VICTIM 
6 IMPACT STATEMENTS AND SO FORTH. AND AFTER REVIEWING ALL 
7 OF THESE MATERIALS I AM STRUCK BY SEVERAL THINGS. FIRST 
8 AND PROBABLY FOREMOST, I'M STRUCK BY THE SENSELESSNESS 
9 AND BRUTALITY OF THESE CRIMES. TWO INNOCENT WOMEN 
10 NEEDLESSLY DIED AND OTHER INDIVIDULS WERE PUT IN HARM'S 
11 WAY, AND SUFFERED SEVERE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURY AS 
12 A RESULT OF THE CONDUCT IN THE COMMISSION OF THESE 
13 OFFENSES. 
14 MEMBERS OF THE TIEDE FAMILY WHO TESTIFIED AT 
15 THIS TRIAL IN THIS COURTROOM HAVE CERTAINLY DEMONSTRATED 
16 TREMENDOUS STRENGTH AND COURAGE. BUT THEIR LIVES HAVE 
17 BEEN CHANGED FOREVER. YOU HAVE STOLEN FROM THE TIEDE 
18 CHILDREN THE LOVE AND GUIDANCE OF THEIR MOTHER, AND FROM 
19 ROLFE TIEDE THE COMPANIONSHIP OF HIS WIFE. AND THERE ARE 
20 MANY OTHER VICTIMS OF THIS CRIME AS WELL; SONS AND 
21 DAUGHTERS, BROTHERS AND SISTERS. ALL THE LOVED ONES OF 
22 THESE TWO LADIES HAVE SUFFERED GREATLY AND WILL CONTINUE 
23 TO SUFFER. INDEED, IN A SENSE I THINK WE ARE ALL VICTIMS 
24 BECAUSE OF THIS KIND OF SENSELESS, VIOLENT CRIMINAL 
25 CONDUCT THAT DECENT, LAW ABIDING CITIZENS MUST NOW WALK 
CREED BARKER, CSR 
1 OUR STREETS IN FEAR AND NOW MUST BE FEARFUL WITHIN THE 
2 WALLS OF THEIR OWN HOMES. 
3 I HAVE SEARCHED THIS RECORD CAREFULLY AND 
4 EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO ME FOR SOME SIGN ON 
5 YOUR PART OF GENUINE REMORSE OR REGRET FOR WHAT HAS 
6 OCCURRED, FOR SOME SIGN OF GENUINE SYMPATHY OR COMPASSION 
7 FOR THE VICTIMS IN THIS CRIME. AND WHAT EXPRESSIONS I 
8 HAVE SEEN, IN MY OPINION, HAVE COME FAR TOO LATE AND ARE 
9 FAR TOO UNCONVINCING TO HAVE ANY MITIGATING EFFECT ON 
10 YOUR SENTENCE. 
11 I'VE READ YOUR STATEMENTS IN THE PRE-SENTENCE 
12 REPORT ABOUT THE PAIN THAT YOU FEEL IN NOT BEING ABLE TO 
13 FORGIVE YOURSELF, AND DOUBT IF YOU'LL EVER BE ABLE TO 
14 COPE WITH WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND THAT YOU FEEL GUILTY. 
15 BUT THERE IS NOTHING IN THAT STATEMENT THAT MENTIONS THE 
16 PAIN OF THE VICTIMS OF THESE CRIMES. 
17 THEREFORE, MR. DELI, THE SENTENCE AND 
18 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS GOING TO BE AS FOLLOWS: UNDER 
19 COUNT ONE, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE 
20 IN THE MURDER OF BETH POTTS, THE COURT SENTENCES YOU TO 
21 SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM IN THE UTAH STATE PRSON OF 
22 FIVE YEARS TO LIFE. THE COURT SENTENCES YOU TO AN 
23 ADDITIONAL TERM OF ONE YEAR, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT 
24 CONCURRENTLY, AND AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF NOT MORE THAN 
25 FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY, AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, 
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1 AS A FIREARMS ENHANCEMENT. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS 
2 OVERWHELMING THAT A FIREARM WAS USED THROUGHOUT THIS 
3 CRIMINAL EPISODE, AND INDEED, HAS NOT BEEN DISPUTED IN 
4 ANY PRE-SENTENCE MATERIALS THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO 
5 ME. 
6 UNDER COUNT TWO, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN 
7 THE SECOND DEGREE IN THE MURDER OF KAY TIEE, THE COURT 
8 SENTENCES YOU TO SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM IN THE UTAH 
9 STATE PRISON OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE. THE COURT SENTENCES 
10 YOU TO AN ADDITIONAL ONE YEAR, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND 
11 NOT CONCURRENTLY, AND AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF NOT MORE THAN 
12 FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AS 
13 A FIREARMS ENHANCEMENT. 
14 COUNT THREE, ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, THE 
15 COURT SENTENCES YOU TO SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM IN THE 
16 UTAH STATE PRISON OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE. THE COURT 
17 SENTENCES YOU TO AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF ONE YEAR, TO RUN 
18 CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AND AN ADDITIONAL 
19 TERM OF NOT MORE THAN FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY 
20 AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AS A FIREARM ENHANCMENT. 
21 UNDER COUNT FOUR, AGGRAVATED ARSON, THE COURT 
22 SENTENCES YOU TO SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM AT THE UTAH 
23 STATE PRISON OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE. 
24 UNDER COUNT FIVE, AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING FOR 
25 THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING OF TRICIA TIEDE, THE COURT 
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1 SENTENCES YOU TO A TERM OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE, FOR A 
2 MINIMUM MANDATORY TERM OF 15 YEARS. AND AN ADDITIONAL 
3 ONE YEAR TERM TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, 
4 AND AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF NOT MORE THAN FIVE YEARS, TO 
5 RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AS A FIREARMS 
6 ENHANCEMENT. THIS COURT FINDS THE FOLLOWING TO BE IN 
7 AGGRAVATION OF THE CRIME AND SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE 
8 IMPOSITION OF THE HIGHER MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE: THE 
9 VICTIM IN THIS CASE WAS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE. SHE WAS 
10 16 YEARS OF AGE WHEN THIS OCCURRED. AT THE TIME OF THE 
11 KIDNAPPING TRICIA HAD JUST WITNESSED HER FATHER BEING 
12 SHOT AND PRESUMABLY THOUGHT HIM TO BE LEFT FOR DEAD IN A 
13 BURNING CABIN. TRICIA WAS THEN PLACED IN HARM'S WAY IN A 
14 HIGH SPEED AUTOMOBILE CHASE AND SUBSEQUENTLY AN ARMED 
15 CONFRONTATION WITH POLICE OFFICERS. 
16 UNDER COUNT SIX, AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING FOR 
17 THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING OF LINAE TIEDE, THE COURT 
18 SENTENCES YOU TO A TERM OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE WITH A 
19 MINIMUM MANDATORY OF 15 YEARS. THE COURT SENTENCES YOU 
20 TO AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF ONE YEAR, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY 
21 AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AND AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF NOT MORE 
22 THAN FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT 
23 CONCURRENTLY, AS A FIREARM ENHANCEMENT. THE COURT FINDS 
24 TO BE IN AGGRAVATION OF THE CRIME THE FOLLOWING: THE 
25 VICTIM IN THIS CASE WAS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE, 20 YEARS 
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1 OLD, WHO JUST WITNESSED HER FATHER, GRANDMOTHER AND 
2 MOTHER HAVING BEEN SHOT AND LEFT FOR DEAD IN A BURNING 
3 CABIN, BOUND AND GAGGED BY YOU, MR. DELI, WHO THEN 
4 THREATENED HER WITH A KNIFE AT HER THROAT. AND AGAIN HER 
5 SISTER AND HER WERE SUBJECTED TO A HIGH SPEED CHASE AND 
6 AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH POLICE OFFICERS. 
7 UNDER COUNT SEVEN, AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. FOR 
8 THAT THE COURT SENTENCES YOU TO AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF 
9 FIVE YEARS TO LIFE. THE COURT SENTENCES YOU TO AN 
10 ADDITIONAL TERM OF ONE YEAR, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT 
11 CONCURRENTLY, AND AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF NOT MORE THAN 
12 FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AS 
13 A FIREARM ENHANCEMENT. 
14 UNDER COUNT EIGHT, THEFT, SECOND DEGREE. THE 
15 COURT SENTENCES YOU TO SERVE A TERM OF ONE TO 15 YEARS AT 
16 THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
17 AND UNDER COUNT TEN, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. THE 
18 COURT SENTENCES YOU TO SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM IN THE 
19 UTAH STATE PRISON FROM ZERO TO FIVE YEARS. IN ADDITION, 
20 THE COURT SENTENCES YOU TO SERVE AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF 
21 ONE YEAR, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AND 
22 AN ADDITIONAL TERM NOT TO EXCEED FIVE YEARS, TO RUN 
23 CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY, AS A FIREARMS 
24 ENHANCEMENT. 
25 THAT BRINGS ME TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THESE 
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1 SENTENCES SHOULD RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY. 
2 IT'S THE OPINION OF THE COURT, MR. DELI, DUE TO THE 
3 EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES OF THESE CRIMES AND FURTHER DUE TO 
4 THE FACT THAT YOU HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED TIME AT THE UTAH 
5 STATE PRISON, AND AT THE TIME OF THESE CRIMES WAS A 
6 FUGITIVE OF JUSTICE, THE COURT IS ORDERING THAT ALL OF 
7 THE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED SENTENCES IN THIS MATTER BE SERVED 
8 CONSECUTIVELY AND NOT CONCURRENTLY. FURTHER, UNDER ALL 
9 OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE THE COURT IS OF THE 
10 OPINION THAT IF YOU AT ANY TIME ARE ALLOWED TO GO FREE 
11 THAT SOCIETY WILL BE AT CONTINUED RISK. ACCORDINGLY, THE 
12 COURT WILL INDEED MAKE A RECOMMENDATION TO THE BOARD OF 
13 PARDONS THAT YOU NOT BE ALLOWED THE BENEFIT OF PAROLE. 
14 DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
15 SENTENCING, MR. GRAVIS? 
16 MR. GRAVIS: NO QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
17 THE COURT: THAT WILL BE FORTHWITH. 
18 ANY QUESTIONS, MR. CHRISTIANSEN? 
19 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: NONE, THANK YOU. 
20 THE COURT: COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
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